The ATLAS collaboration is an example of a distributed problem-solving network in the context of "Big Science", a relatively recent kind of large-scale scientific projects involving big budgets, big stuffs, big machines and laboratories 1 ATLAS is an archetypical example of this type of scientific projects in high-energy physics (HEP), similar endeavours can be found in basic physics, astronomy, but also in life sciences.
.
The ATLAS collaboration has its roots in UA1 and UA2, two very successful HEP experiments conducted at CERN in the 1980s. These experiments became well known for the discovery of the W and Z bosons that led to the Nobel Prize for physics being awarded to CERN researchers in 1984. In the early 1990s, groups of scientists started to form a new collaboration for developing a novel detector concept, to construct this scientific instrument and to eventually run the experiment when the LHC starts its operation in 2008, an event which is going to introduce a new generation of particle physics experiments.
The nature of the problem tackled by the ATLAS collaboration, which is highly distributed in multiple senses, is one of the reasons that make ATLAS an exceptional case for studying DPSNs. First, the problem is distributed across multiple groups of problem solvers. Some 2000 scientists in 165 working groups at globally distributed institutes have been engaged since 1992 in the design of this complex technological architecture with its many subsystems. Similarly, the engineering, construction (in several cases outsourced to private firms) and installation of the many components was distributed across this collaborative network.
Figure: Global distribution of the ATLAS collaboration
Moreover, the problem of designing and building this large-scale scientific instrument is distributed in the sense that it involves partial solutions from a multitude of disciplines and backgrounds. The work raised numerous theoretical and practical engineering challenges in many specialized disciplines (e.g., high-energy physics, mechanical and electrical engineering, semi-conductor technology, cryogenics, and computer science), and required unusual efforts at cross-disciplinary understanding and collaboration. It is interesting to learn how this collaboration could mobilize the different specialities of these groups in a way that they could work in parallel. In particular, how could this distributed collaboration achieve the high level of coordination of work done by specialist teams, and the integration of their partial solutions, which was necessary in the development of ATLAS?
One of the most striking observations from our study of ATLAS was that this joint innovation effort seemed to break with the rules of traditional project management. Such a traditional approach would involve a sequence of well-defined project stages 3,4 initiating the project with explicit specification of the project goals, the creation of a budget and a project charter, which assigns to the different participants the responsibilities. A core group would then craft conceptual designs involving the evaluation and selection of alternative concepts for meeting the specified requirements. This phase usually ends with selection of a system architecture and technologies mature enough to be used. The diverse components would be further developed and eventually be produced by various project members according to clearly specified costs, tasks, deliverables, and schedules.
The development of ATLAS did not follow such a well-structured, linear process. On the contrary, it seemed as if the collaboration tried to avoid establishing structures in the early stages at all. It started collaboration consisting of loosely coupled R&D projects that had crystallized around rather informal project leaders. These R&D projects were not based on prior feasibility studies or conceptual designs, which could have indicated what components and technologies would be needed for the detector; instead, the focus of the projects was determined by what each group thought would be most interesting, which usually was an area where they had exceptional expertise and they thought they would be able to contribute something to the collaboration. In the first phase of the collaboration from 1992 to 1994 there was no project management office at all and in subsequent years a relatively small number of people were concerned with integration of the overall system. Project management tools such as the critical path method were not used at all except for scheduling of the construction and installation phase. This situation to some extent resembles the organization of open source software projects but it probably would be a nightmare for project managers in a traditional industrial context. Why was it that such an loosely structured organization could work, or maybe even was necessary to develop a complex technological system such as the ATLAS detector?
The task of designing a complex technological system can be conceptualized as choosing options in a multi-dimensional design space. This task is not trivial since many of the options are interrelated and a specific choice may feed back into the system and affect the expected value of already selected options. The development of a conceptual design under these circumstances is an optimization process involving multiple, potentially conflicting constraints. This task, which may already be a challenge in the context of mature technologies involving best practices and dominant designs that had emerged from decades of experience, is further complicated when it comes to developing truly novel technological systems. The goal of ATLAS was to develop a detector that is capable of observing particle collisions at 700 % of the energy involved in the largest experiment so far, a challenge that was exceeding the limits of existing technologies. The design and construction of ATLAS required novel combinations of technologies, of which some have never been tested and proved feasible before. Therefore, the collaboration was confronting fundamental uncertainty in developing the architecture of ATLAS. Not only did the groups have to solve for multiple constraints: in the process of developing novel technologies, the collaboration was uncovering additional constraints that were affecting the compatibility of the various components involved.
To give an example of what this means, as it turned out that the construction of the superconducting magnet -the largest magnet system of this type ever built -at the original size was not feasible and needed to be downscaled to a smaller radius, this had all sorts of implications for components that were surrounded by this magnet system. One of the additional constraints emerging for these components was, for example, that several parts such as power supplies, connectors or signal converters had to be "off-detector", which means remote from the component itself, which in turn created compatibility issues with other components due to signal noise, unexpected heat dissipation, or simply for the limited space available. The challenges involved in this process exceeded the complexity that could be managed by any single individual or small team, the reason for which the conceptual development was bound to be organized in a highly distributed manner. Moreover, the development of the ATLAS architecture had to be organized as a non-linear process, since options -once selected -might turn out not to be feasible and require several iterations of revisiting design decisions at a later stage.
What appeared to be shortcoming from the traditional perspective on development projectsthe lack of a clear structure, deliverables, and schedules -seemed to be key for the success of this collaboration. But the fact that we did not see traditional structures does not mean that there was no structure at all. However, structures emerged in a decentralized manner through subgroups that formed with in the collaboration in a self-organizing process. Groups formed tightly connected clusters around components and related technologies in such a way that many latent compatibility issues were contained within such a cluster. The boundaries of these groups sometimes -but not necessarily -coincided with the structures of participating institutes. In other cases, clusters formed independently of institute affiliation. This hidden structure becomes visible by identifying interaction patterns in the collaboration. For this purpose, we plotted the interaction of more than 200 individuals in a series of 130 meetings of various subgroups during the initial configuration phase of ATLAS. The graph nicely displays the subtle structure that emerges from the complex interaction patterns inside the ATLAS collaboration: participants who frequently attend meetings together are aligned whereas members interacting in meetings only occasionally have are relatively distant. On the graph appear several clusters with very dense connection patterns inside and loser connections between the different groups. A closer look at the graph also tells us that most resulting clusters are of semi-permanent nature only, which means that the collaboration was able to reconfigure the various groups and change its structure constantly throughout the design phase. As different problems requiring a novel combination of specialties and expertise arose, participants were able to change the cluster or even form new ones. Such an emergent organization reflected the evolutionary nature of this complex technological system and seemed to be more appropriate than the deterministic approaches used in traditional domains.
Figure: Structure emerging from ATLAS co-authorship
An even clearer visualization of the collaborative structure results from the analysis of coauthorship in the ATLAS Notes, a series of internal publication dedicated to documenting the intellectual and technological efforts put into the development of ATLAS. From this collection of more than 2.400 articles involving almost 4.000 authors, we constructed a network representation of groups of individuals who worked jointly on specific sub-tasks and how this work was related to the overall DSPN. The color code of the both nodes and links indicates the time at which the activity took place using the spectral colors ranging from 1992 (cold colors) to 1997 (warm colors). The absence of blue and green clusters at the core of the graph reflects the absence of a centralized core team that would propagate the conceptual design team in a top down approach. What we see instead are decentralized clusters that are strongly connected within and loosely coupled across the different groups. The development of ATLAS through this geographically distributed and decentralized process was made possible because a commonly accepted "modular architecture" 5 emerged from these interactions, which enabled the decomposition of the complex problem into relatively independent components that can be solved in parallel and eventually be integrated. The increasing density of yellow and orange links indicates such efforts of integrating the various components that took place as the designs of the subsystems had emerged.
From both our attempts to uncover the structure of the ATLAS collaboration it became clear that the boundaries of the different groups were permeable. It appears that this DPSN entailed a grid of social interactions among the "experts" that integrated the knowledge of groups working at the boundaries of different components. These social interactionssometimes conducted in co-located meetings and sometimes in online exchangeseventually led to the emergence of a common concept for the system's architecture. We expect that zooming into individual clusters of this network would show groups of people who usually are co-located or have a track record of prior collaboration, both facilitating the close interaction required for solving complex sub-problems. The highly connected individuals who are linked with other clusters were frequently interacting with members from other groups in co-located meetings and workshops.
Communications among the distributed teams in this project were enabled and structured by extensive use of the Internet and its precursor networks. CERN, and the HEP community in general, was a pioneer in using ICT for facilitating problem solving in a network of distributed groups and individuals (e.g., the World Wide Web and many of its protocols such as HTML were invented by scientists at CERN to enable information management and documentation throughout geographically dispersed collaborations). Similarly, ATLAS has used electronic mail and web repositories already in the early 1990s to mitigate the disadvantage of geographical dispersed groups. In the mid 1990s, more elaborate engineering databases and central document repositories with version control and ownership management were established as a standard throughout the collaboration. An effort was made not to hide information in order to reduce complexity, but to make it accessible to all participants and let them decide whether it is relevant in their respective context.
The ability of generating an architecture that is feasible and possible to build -a complex task that required solving several complementarity problems on the one hand, and a sufficient modularization that allowed for splitting up the overall task into sub-problems on the other hand -certainly is a great achievement of the ALTAS collaboration. The growth of such a scientific collaboration can be thought of as achievement in itself, in particular when one takes into account the mobilization of resources and knowledge of the various groups involved. For example, the collaboration raised roughly half a billion CHF in financial resources -this figure includes the costs for material and equipment only and would be even higher when accounting for labor -from more than hundred different funding agencies. Thus said, this performance of building a HEP detector needs to be juxtaposed to alternative ways of reaching the goal. Although ATLAS is a unique case, it is possible to think of some other forms of organization that fulfill a comparable achievement and compare it with challenges the alternative regimes are confronting.
Two alternative approaches can be found in the traditional organization of large-scale industrial R&D projects. Obviously, the detector could be developed by a large central R&D organization as it is used by traditional industries, for example for the development of complex technological systems in the aerospace industries. In this setting, all the problem solvers are basically in the same organizational entity. A second type of organization used in industry is a network of contractors orchestrated by a system integrator. The system integrator decomposes the overall task into sub-problems that can be outsourced to various problem solvers. He needs to sufficiently specify these sub-problems and define a modular architecture that specifies how the various components relate to each other. Elements of this approach were used by CERN in order to build the LHC infrastructure (i.e., the 27 km particle accelerator). It is difficult to compare the total system output and the associated costs of this project with ATLAS since the cases are rather idiosyncratic. However, the experience of CERN has shown that collaboration with industry, in a context of complex systems which push existing technologies to the limits, turned out to be more expensive and to require more time than anticipated.
A third alternative for organizing the design of a complex technological system is to employ a distributed R&D network, however with centralization of decision rights through property rights. This type of organization was selected by CMS, the sister experiment of ATLAS, by centralization of funds. Similar to ATLAS, there is a large collaboration of different member institutes. In contrast to ATLAS, these institutes have delegated control over the use of their resources to a centralized management. That way, the DPSN is less distributed in the sense that definition of the problem and its sub-problems as well as the assignment of sub-tasks is not part of the distributed problem solving process anymore; rather, a central management executes this coordinative task.
Since CMS is developing a similar technological system in an almost identical context, this would be an excellent case for comparison with the total system output and associated cost of ATLAS. Although data in comparable quality to that of ATLAS is not available, anecdotal evidence shows that the CMS organization and its procedures resemble much more that of traditional hierarchical organizations. CMS with its more centralized decision making seemed to have the edge over ATLAS in the early phase of designing the detector since there was less "friction" and "redundancy" in the design process. Interestingly, when the two collaborations were confronting problems in the final design phase and even more so in the construction phase, CMS seemed to have more difficulties in resolving technological issues and finding workarounds when they were approaching technological limits.
Other topics:
• Deferral of decisions (design space kept open for long time)
• Negotiation of architecture (learning by negotiation)
• How did the collaboration keep momentum (motivating individuals to work for a distant target -15+ years)
• Example of compatibility issues of components such as pre-showring of calorimeter which resulted in integration of solenoid by the calorimeter group
• Decrease of diameter due to cost issues, reduction of inner detector radius which was already tight, space for services and electronics between muon chambers. 
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